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Sentenced to Prison, Sentenced to AIDS:
The Eighth Amendment Right to be
Protected from Prison's Second Death
Row
The "Red Death" had long devastated the country. No pestilence had ever been so fatal, or so hideous. Blood was its Avatar and its seal - the redness and the horror of blood. There
were sharp pains, and sudden dizziness, and then profuse bleeding at the pores, with dissolution. The scarlet stains upon the
body and especially upon the face of the victim, were the pest
ban which shut him out from the aid and from the sympathy of
his fellow-men. And the whole seizure, progress and termination of the disease, were the incidents of half an hour.
But the Prince Prospero was happy and dauntless and sagacious. When his dominions were half depopulated, he summoned to his presence a thousand hale and light-hearted
friends from among the knights and dames of his court, and
with these retired to the deep seclusion of one of his castellated
abbeys . . . . A strong and lofty wall girded it in. This wall
had gates of iron. The courtiers, having entered, brought furnaces and massy hammers and welded the bolts. They resolved
to leave means neither of ingress or egress to the sudden impulses of despair or of frenzy from within. With such precautions the courtiers might bid defiance to contagion. The external world could take care of itself In the meantime it was folly
to grieve or to think. The prince had provided all the appliances of pleasure . . . . All these and security were within.
Without was the "Red Death" ...

I. Introduction
The complaints of prisoners incarcerated in our federal and
state correctional

systems inundate our nation's courts.2

After

thousands of hours are spent in investigation and litigation, many of
I. EDGAR ALLAN POE, The
EDGAR ALLAN POE 250-51 (1902).

Masque of the Red Death, in 4 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
Cf. Doe v. Coughlin, 132 Misc. 2d 709, 505 N.Y.S.2d 534,

535 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (comparing public anxiety over AIDS to that described in Poe's tale).
2. In 1986, prisoners filed 33,765 complaints of a total 254,828 filed in the federal courts
alone. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN: THE FEDERAL CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (July 1987).
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these claims are ultimately dismissed as invalid or meritless. a Since
1983, however, a new type of prisoners' claim has begun appearing
on court dockets." This concern, in some ways distinguishable from a
host of other claims, is a valid one.
The concern is a communicable and deadly disease -

Acquired

Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). First discovered in 1981,1 it
has fatally attacked the immune systems of 16,500 Americans and
infected many more.6 Presently there is no cure for the virus that
causes AIDS, and the prospects for developing one in the near future
are at best uncertain. What is certain, however, is the disease's fatal

end result 8 and its potential for reaching epidemic proportions within
the next five years.9 With this brief but ominous history, AIDS, understandably, has caused great concern in society at large.
In prisons, that concern is multiplied by the loss of liberty inherent in incarceration, both that imposed by the correctional system
and that imposed by other inmates. Often, prisoners are not free to
choose whether to participate in activities known to be an avenue of
transmission for the disease.' 0 These considerations, coupled with the

fact that the rate of AIDS in the correctional system is already substantially higher than that in the general population," mark the incarcerated as highly vulnerable to the disease and acutely aware of

its accompanying problems.

2

In light of the failure of most correctional systems to respond to

the threat, it is not surprising that prisoners' AIDS suits have begun
appearing on our court dockets'3 and that other issues posed by
3. Id.
4. See La Rocca v. Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d 697, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
5. T. HAMMET, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 1986 UPDATE: AIDS IN
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 3 (1987) [hereinafter UPDATE] (citing CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, AIDS WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE REPORT - U.S. (Jan. 5, 1987)).

6. Id. at 3. The Center for Disease Control (CDC) estimated that by the end of 1986,
there were 24,100 cases of AIDS in the United States. In addition, many other Americans,
although asymptomatic, are carriers of the disease. Id. See also W. Morgan, AIDS: Current
and Future Trends 101 PUB. HEALTH REP. 459-65 (1986).
7. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
8. id.
9. See Van Der Linden, The Worst Case Scenario on AIDS, The Daily News, Oct. 12,
1987, at 4, col. 3.
10. See infra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
II. See infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
12. See Judd v. Packard, No. S. 87-1514 slip op. (D.C. Md. Sept. 24, 1987). AIDS has
the "potential for causing a plague of ...
Biblical proportions . . . . The danger is heightened in the closed community of a penal institution." Id. at -.
13. See United States v. Kazenbach, No. 86-2267, slip op. (8th Cir. July 27, 1987);
Judd v. Packard, No. S. 87-1514, slip op. (D.C. Md. Sept. 24, 1987); Muhammad v. Warden,
C.A. No. 87-5282, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1987); Jarrett v. Faulkner, 662 F. Supp. 928
(S.D. Ind. 1987); Smith-bey v. Captain of the Guard, No. 86-3274, slip op. (D.C. Kan. Dec.
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AIDS in the correctional setting have begun receiving media attention.1 What has been surprising, however, is the reaction of the judiciary to these complaints. Clothing themselves in doctrines of either
judicial deference1 5 or ignorance,16 nearly all of our courts have refused to interfere with prison administrators' approaches to the
AIDS threat in the correctional setting.
This Comment will propose that such refusal is both shortsighted and inconsistent with the judiciary's responsibility to protect
threatened constitutional rights. It will suggest that possible exposure of healthly inmates to the AIDS virus constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and also threatens society at large. Finally, it will
conclude that the right of prisoners to be protected from AIDS infection can be realistically accommodated within the correctional
system through a program of inmate education, testing, and humane
segregation and that, where prison officials have refused to implement such a program, the judiciary has the power and the duty to
intervene.
II.

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

A.

The Disease
1. Cause and Classification.-Acquired Immune Deficiency

Syndrome is a fatal, currently incurable 17 disease whose crippling
effects, transmitability, and unknown origin have made it the top-

priority health concern of the decade.

8

Caused by a virus' 9 that in-

1I, 1986); Foy v. Owens, No. 85-6909, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 1986); Powell v. Department of Corrections, No. 85-C-820-C, No. 85-C-816-B, slip op. (N.D. Okla. Feb. 20, 1986);
Cordero v. Coughlin, No. 84 Civ. 728, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1984); Doe v. Coughlin, 132
Misc. 2d 709, 505 N.Y.S.2d 534 (Sup. Ct. 1986); La Rocca v. Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d 697,
467 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
14. See, e.g., Free Condoms for Convicts, TIME, Apr. 27, 1987 at 60 (reporting that
several institutions have considered issuing condoms to inmates); Bennett Would Detain Some
Carriers of AIDS, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1987, at A-13, col. I (reporting that some officials
are considering delayed releases for those with AIDS who threaten to infect others); AIDS in
Prison: Hard Questions for the Justice System, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1987, at 1, col. 2 (reporting that New York has a policy of early release for its AIDS inmates).
15. See infra notes 68-93 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. But cf.Judd, slip op. at - (taking
note that AIDS poses a major threat in the prison environment).
17. UPDATE, supra note 5, at 3 (citing INST. OF MEDICINE, NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS: DIRECTIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTH CARE AND RESEARCH
219, 229 (1986)). The probability of a vaccine becoming available in the next five to ten years
is "low." Id.
18. See UPDATE, supra note 5, at iii; Pear, Health Chief Calls AIDS Battle No. I Priority, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
19. The virus HTLV-III/LAV was named by the two individuals who discovered it.
Robert C. Gallo, M.D. Chief, Tumor Cell Biology Laboratory, National Cancer Institute, is
the American discoverer of the AIDS virus. He identified the virus as human T-cel leukemia
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fects and destroys certain white blood cells,2" the disease gradually
* undermines21 that part of the body's immune system which normally
combats infections and malignancies.2 2 It thus leaves its victims host
2
to a number of opportunistic infections. 1
Researchers have categorized AIDS into three stages or phases.
The largest group2 4 is comprised of individuals who test positive for
antibodies to the HTLV-III virus but remain asymptomatic. Confirmed seropositivity means that the individual has been infected
with the AIDS virus at some point, although his body may have subsequently fought off the infection. While seropositive individuals may
never develop any symptoms of the disease or end-stage AIDS, they
may still transmit the virus to others.2 5
A diagnosis of AIDS Related Complex (ARC), the second category of the disease, 6 is based upon the presence of a combination of
conditions that are quite mild but nevertheless together give evidence
of infection with the AIDS virus. 27 Individuals with ARC may re-

cover,28 but remain infected.29

virus 111. Luc Montangnier, M.D. of the Pasteur Institute, Paris, first isolated the virus and
named it lymphadenopathy-associated virus. Comment, AIDS in the Classroom: Room for
Reason Amidst Paranoia, 91 DICK. L. REV. 1055, 1057 n.21 (1987) (citing Price, AIDS, the
Schools, and Policy Issues, 56 J. OF SCH. HEALTH 137 (Apr. 1986)).

20. T. Hammett,

NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE,

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

AIDS

IN CORREC-

TIONAL FACILITIES: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 3 (1986) [hereinafter ISSUES AND OPTIONS].

21. The white blood cells or T-lymphocytes affected by AIDS have several subpopulations: helper T-cells, which aid other immune cells in defending the body against disease, and
suppressor T-cells, which inhibit the immune system from overreacting. Comment, supra note
19, at 1057 (citing Breen, AIDS, An Acquired Community Problem, 32 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q.
249, 255 (1986)). The AIDS virus selectively infects the T-helper cells while leaving the Tsuppressor cells untouched. Id. (citing Price, supra note 19). Over a period of time with successive infections, the virus kills T-helper cells and spills new virus into the blood stream. Id.

22.

ISSUES AND OPTIONS,

supra note 20, at 3.

23. Opportunistic infections are disorders that would not generally be life-threatening to
persons with normal immune systems but are eventually fatal to those with depressed immune
systems. Id. The opportunistic infection and malignancy most common to AIDS victims are
Pneumocystis Carinii pneumonia and Kaposi's sarcoma, a cancer of the blood cell walls. Comment, supra note 19, at 1058 n.25 (citing THIER, PREFACE TO INST. OF MEDICINE, NAT'L
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, MOBILIZING AGAINST AIDS: THE UNFINISHED STORY OF A VIRUS vii
(1986)).
24. See UPDATE, supra note 5, at 3. The Public Health Service has estimated that by
the end of 1986, as many as 1.5 million Americans were seropositive. Id.
25. ISSUES AND OPTIONS, supra note 20, at 4.
26. Estimates of the number of persons inflicted with ARC vary. Compare UPDATE,
supra note 5, at 3 (estimating that by the end of 1986, 50,000 to 125,000 Americans had

ARC) with Comment, supra note 19, at 1061 (citing Cassens, AIDS Update: HTLV-III/LAV

Infection, PA. MED. 24 (1986)) (estimating that up to 300,000 Americans had ARC as of
January 1986).

27.

ISSUES AND OPTIONS,

supra note 20, at 4. These symptoms may include swollen

lymph nodes, weight loss, and night sweats, as well as blood test results showing depressed
helper T-cells and a depressed helper/suppressor ratio. Id.
28. The conversion rate of ARC patients to "full-blown" AIDS has been estimated between 6 and 29%. Comment, supra note 19, at 1061 (citing Their, supra note 23, at 52).

29.

ISSUES AND OPTIONS,

supra note 20, at 4.
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"End stage" AIDS or "full-blown" acquired immune deficiency

syndrome is an illness characterized by one or more opportunistic
diseases that are at least moderately indicative of underlying cellular
immunodeficiency and an absence of all causes of cellular immunodeficiency other than HTLV-III/LAV infection.30 Severely ill
when diagnosed, over eighty percent of these patients will die within
two years. 31
2.

Carriersand Transmission.-In 1981 when AIDS was ini-

tially discovered, its victims were limited to homosexuals.3 2 Today,
though homosexuals and bisexuals continue to constitute the dominant high-risk group for AIDS infection, the disease is now prevalent
outside of the homosexual community, especially among intravenous
drug users. 33 Thus, such persons are considered to be members of

high-risk groups for the contraction of the disease.34
The susceptibility of such groups to the contraction of AIDS is
directly related to the means by which AIDS is transmitted. Al-

though researchers are uncertain about some possible means of
transmission, they are certain the virus can be passed through sexual

intercourse, the sharing of hypodermic needles, and transfusions of
contaminated blood. 35 In addition to semen and blood, the virus has

also been isolated in saliva and tears. Researchers are fairly certain,
however, that AIDS cannot be passed through casual contact or
through the air."'
B.

AIDS in the CorrectionalSetting

Because of its means of transmission and typical victims, AIDS
poses a special concern in the correctional setting. Our jails not only
30. UPDATE, supra note 5, at 3. An estimated 29,100 Americans had end-stage AIDS
by December 1986. The Center for Disease Control believes that nearly ten times that
amount, 270,000 cases, will be diagnosed by 1991. id.
31. Comment, supra note 19 at 1061 (citing Cassens, supra note 26, at 25). See also
Comment, You Never Told Me . . . You Never Asked: Tort Liabilityfor the Sexual Transmission of AIDS, 91 DiCK. L. REV. 529, 533 (1986) [hereinafter Tort Liability] (citing
Quinn, Perspectives on the Future of AIDS, 253 J. A.M.A. 247, 248 (1985)).
32. Comment, AIDS: A Legal Epidemic?, 17 AKRON L. REV. 717, 720 (1984).
33. UPDATE, supra note 5, at 3. Seventy-four percent of those inflicted with AIDS are
homosexual/bisexuals, while 24% are or have been intravenous drug users. Also at risk are
hemophiliacs. Id.
34. Id.
35. Carey, RXfor AIDS: A Grim Race Against the Clock, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 30, 1985, at 48.
36. Tort Liability, supra note 31, at 532. There is controversy as to whether the virus
can be passed through deep kissing. Id.
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house high numbers of homosexuals and current or former drug
abusers; they also house large numbers of individuals who continue
to engage in these high-risk activities behind bars."7
1. Drug Use.-Because illegal drug use is a common cause of
incarceration, many prisoners in the correctional system have histories of drug abuse. In New York City jails, fifty percent of the inmates are either current or former users of intravenous drugs, 8
while users incarcerated in urban states in general may comprise up
to seventy percent of the inmate population. 9 Further, despite prison
regulations and measures against drug use, many inmates are able to

continue their drug habit behind bars,

0

through means that make

AIDS infection even more likely.,"
2. Homosexual Activity.-Although laws exist that criminal-

ize the sexual transmission of AIDS,"2 homosexual conduct is not
usually a common cause of incarceration.' 3 Nevertheless, homosexual conduct is prevalent within the prison system. Many inmates are

not admitted homosexuals upon beginning incarceration, but the
deprivations involved in incarceration lead many to seek homosexual
gratification." Estimates vary as to the percentage of individuals
37. ISSUES AND OPTIONS, supra note 20, at xiii.
38. Finder, NY Inmates Will Get Condoms as They Leave Jail, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14,
1987, at B-6, cql. 1.
39. AIDS: A Bad Way to Die, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 23, 1987, at 30. Numerous authorities
have recognized that drug abuse occurs behind bars.
40. See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 377 (E.D. Ark. 1970); ISSUES AND OPTIONS, supra note 20, at 15.
41. Because hypodermic needles are not common or permitted in the correctional setting, prisoners will often find it necessary to share needles to continue their habit. See ISSUES
AND OPTIONS, supra note 20, at 15. In addition to drug use, dirty needles and their threat of
AIDS infection in the use of tattooing machines, which are prevalent in many correctional
facilities, also pose a problem. Id. But cf. Smith-bey v. Captain of the Guard, No. 86-3274,
slip op. at - (D.C. Kan. Dec. 11, 1986) (reasoning that since such activities are forbidden
by prison regulations, they do not occur in prison).
42. Recent court decisions have upheld criminal liability for intentional transmission of
AIDS. See United States v. Kazenbach, No. 86-2267 slip op. (8th Cir. July 27, 1987) (upholding conviction for assault); AIDS Decisions Diverge in Cases Against Prisoners, NAT'L L.J.
Sept. 28, 1987, at 6, col. 3 (reporting that a Minnesota federal judge upheld a jury verdict
convicting an AIDS-infected prisoner of assault with a dangerous weapon - his mouth and
teeth - after he bit two prison guards). See also AIDS Patient Who Sold Blood is Ordered to
Stand Trial, AIDS Law and Policy, Sept. 9, 1987, at 7, col. I (reporting that a Los Angeles
municipal court judge has ordered a man with AIDS who sold his blood to a plasma center to
stand trial for attempted murder. The defendant was apprehended in a bank where he was
screaming "I have AIDS! I want to die! Kill me," and told authorities he sold the blood because "If I have to die, they should too.").
43. But see Bowers v. Hardwick, U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (upholding
the constitutionality of laws criminalizing sodomy).
44. See Note, The Problems of Modern Penology: Prison Life and Prisoners' Rights, 53
IOWA L. REV. 671, 698 (1967). In Iowa, for example, less than five percent of inmates are
confirmed homosexuals at the time of incarceration. Id.
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who participate in homosexual activity while incarcerated, but they
consistently range from fifty to ninety-five percent." While some of
this homosexual activity is by choice, much of it is not." Rather, it is
the grim result of homosexual rape.
The problem of homosexual attack within the correctional sys-

tem is widely recognized.

7

While tales of individual incidents are by

'

themselves shocking," the realization that such occurrences happen
with predictable frequency and with little if any preventative or dis-

ciplinary action by corrections officials is even more unacceptable.
Although our courts have acknowledged that homosexual assault is
part of the reality of prison life and have declared the atrocity unconstitutional, the assaults continue to occur. "9 They occur not only
45. Compare Note, Sexual Assault and Forced Homosexual Relationships in Prison:
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36 ALB. L. REv. 428, 431 (1972) (citing J. MARTIN, BREAK
DOWN THE WALLS 177 (1954)) ("Some penologists believe that as many as 95% of the inmates are involved at some time in homosexual experiences.") with C. HOPPER, SEX IN PRISON
85 (1969) (suggesting that at least 50% of inmates have homosexual experiences).
46. Note, supra note 45, at 431. Accord, Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 377 (E.D.
Ark. 1970). The court noted that
there is a great deal of [homosexuality] practiced at Cummins, some consensual, a great deal nonconsensual.
An inmate who is physically attractive to other men may be, and frequently
is, raped in the barracks by other inmates. No one comes to his assistance, the
floorwalkers do not interfere; the trustees look on with indifference or satisfaction, the two free world people on duty appear helpless.
47. Comment, Rape: The Unstated Sentence, 15 PAC. L.J. 899 (1984) (citing LOCKWOOD. PRISON SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 6-7 (1980)); Note, supra note 45, at 431.
48. One 19 year-old prisoner described that,
I fought back the best I could and then I fell on the floor and I got kicked
in the ribs. Three guys were holding me while the other tore my pants off; I
continued to fight until one of the guys knocked me out. One of the guys was
holding me on the floor and had my arms pinned to the floor. And about seven
or eight guys came into the cell and they took turns . . . .When they finished
they left my cell, and I was still laying [sic] on the floor."
Note, supra note 45, at 432-33 n.24. Another authority has noted that
[s]omewhere in North Carolina's prison system this week a boy will be
raped - maybe once, possibly three or four times in one night by different men.
Somewhere behind the bars an effeminate young man too weak or too scared to
fight back will be auctioned as a homosexual partner . . . .The victim might be
serving as little as thirty days for public drunkenness. He might be a high school
student from a 'good home' who was a solid citizen until he stole some money in
one moment of desperation.
Note, The Inadequacy of Prisoners' Rights to Provide Sufficient Protection for Those Confined in Penal Institutions, 48 N.C.L. REv. 847, 867 n.25 (1970).
49. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 421-22 n.6 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In Bailey, the Supreme Court recognized that
[wie do not live in an ideal world even in America, so far as jail and prison
conditions are concerned. The complaints that this Court, and every other American appellate court, receives almost daily from prisoners about conditions of
incarceration, about filth, about homosexual rape . . . are not always the mouthings of the malcontent. The Court itself acknowledges . . . that the conditions
'A youthful inmate can
these respondents complained about do exist .....
expect to be subjected to homosexual gang rape his first night in jail, or it has
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because a large number are never reported,"0 or if reported, never
prosecuted,"' but also because officials consistently fail to take corrective measures. 2 As a result, the problem of AIDS in the correctional setting takes on a character and degree of concern that does
not exist in the population at large. Although prisoners who consensually participate in homosexual intercourse and intravenous drug
use behind bars have in some sense assumed the risk of AIDS, those
who may contract AIDS as a result of homosexual rape or another

involuntary activity5" have certainly not done so. Regardless of the
voluntary or involuntary means of transmission, the probability of a
high concentration of AIDS within the prison setting seems great.
3.

Overall Statistics.-Unfortunately,that high probability is

becoming a grim reality. The coalescence of high numbers of intravenous drug users and persons who engage in homosexual intercourse has indeed resulted in a much higher rate of AIDS within the
prison system than in society at large.5" Specifically, as of October 1,
1986, there were 1,232 confirmed cases of AIDS among inmates in
been said, even in the van on the way to jail. Weaker inmates become the property of stronger prisoners or gangs, who sell the sexual services of the victim.'
Id. (quoting C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 389 (1978); Report on
Sexual Assaults in a Prison System and Sheriffs Vans, 3 CRIME AND JUSTICE 223-28 (L.
Radinowicz & M. Wolfgang 2d ed. 1977)); see also Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir.
1980); Judd v. Packard, No. S. 87-1514, slip op. (D.C. Md. Sept. 24, 1987); Warner v.
County of Washoe, 620 F. Supp. 59 (D.C. Nev. 1985); Alberti v. Heard, 600 F. Supp. 443
(S.D. Tex. 1984).
50. Note, supra note 45, at 433. Of an estimated 2,000 assaults that occurred in the
Philadelphia prison system in one year, only ninety-six were reported to prison authorities. Id.
In California state prisons in 1974, 156 assaults were documented, yet only ninety-six were
reported. Comment, supra note 47, at 902 n.27 (citing C. BOWKER, PRISON VICTIMIZATION
24-25 (1980)). This low reporting rate is attributable to several factors. First, the fear of
retaliation discourages victims from reporting attacks. See Note, supra note 45, at 433; Comment, supra note 47, at 902 (citing People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 220 N.W.2d 212
(1974)). See also United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 426 n.6 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[lf a kid who is raped tells the guards, his life isn't worth a nickel."). Second, the
"Conduct Code," the unwritten rules of conduct enforced by the inmates themselves, mandates
punishment for "ratting." Comment, supra note 47, at 902 (citing H. TOCH, LIVING IN
PRISON: THE ECOLOGY OF SURVIVAL 1966-67 (1977)). Finally, publicity of such a victimization marks the inmate for further attack. Comment, supra note 47, at 902.
51. Comment, supra note 47, at 902.
52. See Bailey, 444 U.S. at 597-98 ("Prison officials either are disinterested in stopping
abuse of prisoners by other prisoners or are incapable of doing so, given the limited resources
society allocates to the prison system."); Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1980).
53. Prisoners could conceivably transmit the AIDS virus in other ways, such as biting.
But see UPDATE, supra note 5, at 2.
54. See Id. at 5. In 1986, the incidence rate of AIDS in the general population of the
United States was 5.3 cases per 100,000 population. In state and federal correctional institutions in 1986, the incidence rate ranged from 5 to 215 cases per 100,000, and in city and
county jails, from 15 to 148 cases per 100,000. Id,
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fifty-eight surveyed federal, state, and local correctional systems, 5 a
figure which represents a sixty-one percent increase since 1985.66 In
fact, in the Rikers Island prison in New York, the number of prisoners with AIDS rose so sharply in 198657 that AIDS is now the leading cause of inmate death within the state."8
Statistics on the number of prisoners with ARC or who test positive for the HTLV virus are less comprehensive and therefore less
accurate, because most jurisdictions do not record incidence rates for
these classifications." Thus, a survey indicating that there are only
349 cases of ARC within the prison system nationwide conveys artificial statistics that are substantially lower than reality.10 Even limited testing in the federal prison system, however, has revealed surprisingly 6 high rates of seropositivity. Under a scaled-down pilot
program,6 2 three percent of those inmates included in the program
tested positive for the HTLV-virus."'
Unfortunately, studies done on the actual transmission of AIDS
are even less conclusive. Researchers have interpreted studies in the
correctional systems of Maryland and New York as suggesting that
actual transmission of AIDS in prison is infrequent." ' Such studies,
55. Id. at 4. This figure includes only reported cases of "full-blown" AIDS. It does not
include those with ARC or those who test positive for the HTLV-111 virus.
56. Id. The survey was taken from November 4, 1985 to October 6, 1986. While the
61 % increase is a substantial one, it is smaller than the 79% increase during the same period
in the population at large. Id. Some experts suggest, however, that this statistically lower rate
results from the fact that prisons had a much higher percentage of AIDS initially. AIDS in
Prison: Hard Questions for the Justice System, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1987, at 1, col. 2.
57. Exact statistics are difficult to ascertain because New York state and city prisons are
by policy forbidden to screen inmates for the HTLV virus. Department of Health officials
confirm, however, that there has been a sharp rise in the number of inmates exhibiting symptoms of the disease. AIDS in Prison: Hard Questions for the Justice System, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 5, 1987, at B-6, col. I.
58. Id. In 1986, 124 New York inmates died of AIDS, while only 62 died of all other
causes combined. In 1982, only three inmates died of AIDS while incarcerated. Id. Nationally,
as of 1986, 529 inmates have died from AIDS while in custody. UPDATE, supra note 5, at 4.
59. UPDATE, supra note 5, at 4. In addition, those prisons that test do so on a limited
basis. Some only test when a doctor recognizes symptoms and orders a test, perhaps because
officials are afraid of what mass testing will reveal. N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1987, at B-6, col. I.
60. UPDATE, supra note 5, at 4.
61. Compare Slow Rise Found in Prison AIDS Cases, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1986, at
A-18, col. I (quoting Anthony Travisono, executive director of the American Correctional
Association) ("We feel good about the future. This is not going to be the problem we once
anticipated.") with Yost, U.S. to Segregate Some AIDS Inmates, The Philadelphia Inquirer,
Oct. 24, 1987, at 10-A, col. I ("[Nleary . . . three percent of those tested under a pilot
program, have tested positive for the AIDS virus.").
62. Those tested included new inmates, inmates about to be released, those who volunteered for the test, and those who exhibited possible symptoms of the disease. Yost, supra note
61 at 10-A, col. I.
63. id.
64. UPDATE, supra note 5, at 6. The New York study based its conclusions on the fact
that no long-term inmates, those who had been continuously incarcerated for seven years or
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however, have inherent flaws and uncertainties65 and require quantum leaps of logic to arrive at such conclusions.6" Indeed, known outbreaks of syphilis and other sexually transmitted diseases in prison
populations suggest that AIDS can also be transmitted in the correctional setting.67
Thus, the problem of AIDS within the correctional setting is a

real one, not only because inmates are often members of the highrisk AIDS groups, but also because while in prison they continue or
begin to engage in high-risk activities. Prisoners have a right to be
protected from a disease that could make any two-year sentence a
capital one, especially when the high-risk activities are involuntarily
imposed upon them by incarceration. Unfortunately, prison officials
have for the most part failed to recognize that right, and state and
federal courts, which have the authority to enjoin them to do so,
have not upheld that right.
III.

AIDS, Prisoners' Rights, and the Courts

A. The Deference Standard
1. Traditional Adherence.-The judiciary's failure to uphold

the rights of prisoners threatened by the AIDS virus is grounded in
deference to prison officials' discretion in handling such matters.

Traditionally, the judiciary has exhibited similar reluctance to intervene in the day-to-day operations of prison administration.68 Such a
"hands-off" approach is based on a number of factors, including concerns of federalism, lack of judicial expertise in penology, a fear that
intervention would hinder internal prison discipline,69 and strong dimore, displayed symptoms of AIDS. Id. The Maryland study, which tested volunteers found
that 1.5% of the long-term inmates tested positive. Id.
65. The long incubation period, the fact that the HTLV-1I1 carrier state is asymptomatic and largely unrecorded, and the small number of long-term inmates render such findings
subject to gross inaccuracies. Id.
66. The fact that many inmates with AIDS may have had the opportunity to contract
the virus outside of the prison does not ipso facto mean that they did not contract the virus
while in prison.
67. ISSUES AND OPTIONS, supra note 20, at 14-15.
68. Note, The Eighth Amendment and State Correctional Overcrowding: The Second
Circuit Serves Up an Ounce of Prevention, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 647, 670 (1986).
69. Id. at 670 n.136. See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48 (1979). The Court
noted that
[i1f prison officials are to be free to take appropriate action to ensure the
safety of inmates and correctional personnel, they must be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their
judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline to maintain institutional security. Such considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of correctional officers, and without substantial evidence to
indicate such officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations,
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rectives from the Supreme Court itself, which has repeatedly announced its allegiance to the standard. In Procunier v. Martinez,0
the Court explained that "the problems of prisons in America are
complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily
susceptible of resolution by decree . . . Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further reason for
deference to the appropriate prison authorities.7 "" In Rhodes v.
Chapman,72 the Court reiterated and enlarged its position to state
that
[clourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or
to the perplexing sociological problems of how best to achieve
the goals of the function of the criminal justice system: to punish justly, to deter future crime, and to return imprisoned persons to society with an improved chance of being useful, law7
abiding citizens. 1
Most recently in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 4 the Court reaffirmed its general stance on the deference standard and its refusal
"to substitute [its] judgment on difficult and sensitive matters of institutional administration for the determinations of those charged
with the formidable task of running a prison. '
2. Necessary Deviation.-Despiteits general adherence to the
deference standard, the Supreme Court has intervened in prison administration when intervention was necessary to prevent clear constitutional violations. For example, despite its general affirmation of the
deference standard in Procunier v. Martinez, the Court acknowledged that a deviation from the standard is at times necessary and
even mandated by the Constitution.7 6 It stressed that "[w]hen a
prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional
courts should defer to their judgment. Not only are such administrators in a
better position to know and determine what action or remedies are needed and
proper, but the operation of our correctional systems and facilities is within the
responsibility of Executive and Legislative branches of government.
Id.
70. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
71. Id. at 404.
72. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
73. Id. at 352.
74. __
U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987).
75. Id. at -,
107 S. Ct. at 2407.
76. 416 U.S. 396, 404-06 ("But a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or state
institution.").
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guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights."' 7 Indeed, such a position is justified, because
"[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the
prisons of this country. 7' 8 Thus, although courts have recognized
that they should be sensitive to their delicate role79 in prison administration, they have also recognized that sensitivity "cannot justify a
failure to take cognizance of clear constitutional violations."80 Finally, while the judiciary cannot assume that legislators are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution, it has not hesitated to
find a constitutional violation and to provide an adequate remedy
when research findings and statistics reflect an indifference by prison
officials and legislators to a right. 81 Indeed, the judiciary has
"learned from repeated investigation and bitter experience that judicial interference is indispensable if constitutional dictates - not to
mention considerations of basic humanity - are to be observed in
the prisons."82

3. The AIDS Cases.-Several courts have specifically mentioned the deference standard as a rationale for failing to protect
prisoners' rights in AIDS cases. The New York Superior Court was
the first to consider the problems of AIDS in the correctional setting.
In La Rocca v. Dalsheim,83 the court reasoned that in view of the
scientific uncertainty concerning AIDS, and the traditional reluctance of courts to intervene in the day-to-day management of a
prison, it would not mandate any procedural regimen regarding the
protection of the rights of AIDS-free patients.84 In so reasoning, the
court rejected any notion that it should, as the claimant prisoners
requested, require prison officials to take further measures to prevent
77. Id.
78. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). Accord, Jones v. Diamond, 436
F.2d 1364, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981) ("A prisoner, whether already convicted of a crime or merely
awaiting trial does not shed all his constitutional rights when he puts on jail clothing.").
79. 416 U.S. at 404-05.
80. Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 1985).
81. See, e.g., Martin v. White, 742 F.2d 469, 473 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding officials'
failure to protect inmates from assault violated the Constitution).
82. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 354 (1981), see also Doe v. District of Columbia, 701 F.2d 948, 960 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Indeed, the special place of prisoners in our
society makes them more dependent on judicial protection than perhaps any other group. Few
minorities are so 'discrete and insular,' so little able to defend their interests through participation in the political process, so vulnerable to oppression by an unsympathetic minority.").
83. 120 Misc. 2d 697, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
84. Id. at -_, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
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AIDS-free inmates from contracting the virus."

Since La Rocca, other courts have refused to intervene in cases
in which prisoners question the treatment of controversial AIDS issues by prison officials. Interestingly, their refusal has resulted in a
very diverse treatment of AIDS victims in the prison system. In

Judd v. Packard,8 a federal district court emphasized both the seriousness of the disease and the reasonableness of segregation in response to it.87 It reasoned that respect is "constitutionally due" to
prison officials' discretion and that it would, as courts traditionally
do, give great weight to policy decisions regarding segregation and

isolation of prisoners. 88 The court thus upheld the medical isolation
of AIDS carriers and dismissed the claims of incarcerated sufferers
who challenged it.89
A district court deciding Jarrett v. Faulkner0 similarly made
reference to the deference standard, 91 although with a different result. Dismissing the claims of inmates who sought a court order to
segregate all AIDS-infected inmates, the court held that "[t]he
problem of protecting prisoners from AIDS is best left to the legislature and prison administrators. ' 92 Jarrett held that those fearing
AIDS and requesting segregation, which the Judd court found rea-

sonable, failed to
Other courts
lowed suit, some
standard, 94 others

state a claim.9"
in evaluating AIDS-related complaints have folby quoting well-worn language of the deference
doing so implicitly by hollowly assuring the claim-

85. Id.
86. Judd v. Packard, No. S. 87-1514, slip op. (D.C. Md. Sept. 24, 1987).
87. Id. at -.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Jarrett v. Faulkner, 662 F. Supp. 928 (S.D. Ind. 1987).
91. Id. at 929 (" 'Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude
towards problems of prison administration.' The problems of the prisons are not readily susceptible to 'resolution by decree.' ") (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 996 (1974)).
92. Id.
93. Id. ("While under some circumstances exposing inmates to a communicable disease
may violate their constitutional rights, this complaint fails to show that the plaintiff class is so
at risk of contracting AIDS that constitutional rights are implicated and injunctive relief is
necessary.").
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 4,
94. See Muhammad v. Warden, C.A. No. 87-5282, slip op. at 1987). The court cites a number of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the deference standard in support of its decision not to intervene by ordering segregation of AIDS carriers. The
court noted that "[faederal courts have a delicate role in complex matters pertaining to the
administration, control, and operation of state prisons . . . restrictions on constitutional rights
must be evaluated in terms of legitimate goals and policies of the penological institution." Id.
(citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,
433 U.S. 119 (1977)).
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ants that no risk of contracting AIDS in prison exists. 95 The Federal
District Court of Kansas has stated, "There is no evidence that being
in prison increases the risk of developing AIDS."96 Explaining that
AIDS can be transferred only by promiscuous sexual contact, anal
intercourse, intravenous drug use, and tattooing, the court reasoned
that "these means by which AIDS may be transmitted are not permissible in prison. The court is unaware of any reason why plaintiff
should be provided any greater rights than those persons not incarcerated. ' 97 Similarly, a Pennsylvania district court, while conceding
that homosexual sodomy does exist in prison and could in specific,
limited circumstances pose a threat for transmission of AIDS, refused to recognize any institution-wide threat of transmission and a
right to be protected from that threat.9 By such refusal, these courts
ignore the grim reality of prison life in which drug use and homosex-

ual activity are common occurrences. 99 They ignore the recognition
by brethren courts that AIDS is a real and potentially devastating

problem within the prison system.100 In the name of deference or
naivete, they neglect and ignore their constitutional duty to protect
guaranteed rights.
As is evident in other areas of case law, the deference standard
is more a pair of gloves for the judiciary than a set of handcuffs.
Although there are some circumstances in which judicial deference
is appropriate, the judiciary is not prevented from intervening when
officials have refused to even recognize that a problem exists. Indeed,
when guaranteed constitutional rights are threatened, whether by
legislative or executive action or inaction, courts have a constitution95. See Smith-bey v. Captain of the Guard, No. 86-3274, slip op. (D.C. Kan. Dec. 11,
1986); Foy v. Owens, No. 85-6909, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 1986).
96. Smith-bey, slip op. at -.
97. Id.
98. Foy v. Ownes, No. 85-6101, slip op. at (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 1986).
99. See supra notes 37-53 and accompanying text.
100. See Judd v. Packard, No. S. 87-1514, slip op. at (D.C. Md., Sept. 24, 1987).
Certainly this court can take judicial notice of the fact that AIDS poses an
almost unprecedented danger to the public health of this country and to the
world . . . a plague of (or beyond) Biblical proportions . . . . Furthermore, the
danger of AIDS is heightened in the closed community of a penal institution,
where carriers of the HTLV-111 virus may readily transmit it, whether wittingly
or unwittingly, to other inmates, through homosexual encounters or otherwise.
Thus, the diagnosis, identification, and treatment of potential AIDS carriers, as
part of a program of AIDS prevention, certainly has a legitimate purpose, especially in the prison setting.
Id.; see also Cordero v. Coughlin, No. 84 Civ. 728 slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1984); La Rocca
v. Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d 697, -,
467 N.Y.S.2d 302, 309 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (finding that
because "sexual intimacy among inmates is not a matter of sexual preference, but of sexual
compulsion . . . it must be, and indeed is, recognized that a state correctional facility . . . is a
potentially high risk setting for AIDS.").
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ally imposed duty to safeguard those rights.

B. The Eighth Amendment Right
Although the plethora of AIDS cases point to a number of possible infringed rights that courts should be willing to scrutinize, the
constitutional right most clearly implicated is that of the eighth
amendment. 101 It seems clear that a prisoner who is involuntarily
exposed to and infected with the AIDS virus while incarcerated, as
the result of a failure by prison officials to protect him, has been
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment.0 2
1. History.-A ban upon cruel and unusual punishment was
part of the Anglo-American common law even before it was incorporated into the Constitution as the eighth amendment in 1791.13 The
eighth amendment, with its proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment, was originally directed at prohibiting torture and other
barbarous methods of punishment"' that had recently been abolished in England.0 5 Gradually, however, the Supreme Court expanded its protections beyond the barbarous physical punishment at

issue in the Court's earliest cases. 106 The Court denounced as uncon101. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). A finding of cruel and unusual
punishment may provide other remedies to the victim in addition to injunctive relief abating
the violative conditions. For example, a prison official, by imposing conditions that amount to
cruel and unusual punishment, may be subject to liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See, e.g., Martin v. White, 742 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1984); Union County Jail Inmates v.
DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1983); Inmates of Occoguan v. Barry, 650 F. Supp. 619
(D.D.C. 1986).
Prisoners afflicted with AIDS who are deprived of certain rights while incarcerated may
seek relief under federal laws that prohibit discrimination against the handicapped. But see
Judd v. Packard, No. S. 87-1514, slip op. at - (D.C. Md. Sept. 24, 1987) ("Official discrimination against handicapped individuals (adopting for this purpose a broad definition of
'handicapped,' and assuming that it fits within it, cf. School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, U.S. -,
107 S.Ct. 1123 (1987)) is not invidious discrimination, and thus it is not
subject to strict or heightened judicial scrutiny.").
102. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345 (1981) (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678 (1978)) ("It is unquestioned that '[clonfinement in a prison ... is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under the eighth amendment standards.' ").
103. See Comment, supra note 45, at 429 ("Drawn from the English Bill of Rights in
1688, this ban was included in the Virginia Declaration of Rights adopted in 1776.
...
).
104. Snyder v. Blackenship, 423 F. Supp. 1208, 1212 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Such punishments included pillorying, disemboweling, decapitating, branding, and drawing and quartering.
Id.
105. Note, Creatures,Persons, and Prisoners: Evaluating Prison Conditions Under the
Eighth Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099, 1101 (1982). See also Granucci, "Nor Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839; Comment,
supra note 47, at 907.
106. See generally In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S.
130 (1878).
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stitutional punishments that were grossly disproportionate to the of107
fense committed.
2. Current Standards.-Today, the judiciary's determination
of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment goes beyond that
which is physically barbarous or disproportionate. Modern courts
have been willing to recognize that "[tihe eighth amendment is intended to protect and safeguard a prison inmate from an environment where degeneration is probable and self-improvement unlikely
because of the conditions existing which inflict needless suffering,
whether physical or mental." 108 Although the Supreme Court has
not established a concrete test for determining violations of the prohibition,109 it has suggested several criteria by which claims can be
evaluated. According to the Court, punishment cannot "involve the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," 110 which is "totally without penological justification.""' Instead, punishment must meet an
eighth amendment standard that "draw[s] meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' 12 For the purposes of such analysis, what is decent depends
upon "the public attitude toward a given sanction," ' s not the circumstances common in other prisons. 1 ' Indeed, it may also involve
what the reviewing court objectively considers "decent. 113

107. See O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 340 (1892). See also Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (finding that a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive for the crime of rape); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 324 (1910)
(finding that a sentence of fifteen years at hard labor was grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime committed - the falsifying of a public document).
108. Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 393 (10th Cir. 1977).
109. The Supreme Court has, in contrast, interpreted the amendment "in a flexible and
dynamic manner." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (joint opinion). See also
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1984) ("No static test can exist by which courts
.
determine whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual ...
110. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
Ill. Id. at 183. See also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
112. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality decision)). See also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102.
113. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349 n. 13; see also Doe v. District of Columbia, 701 F.2d 948,
964 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). "The
touchstone is 'what the general public would consider decent.' ").
114. See Doe, 701 F.2d at 964 ("[Clonditions in the nation's prisons are often extraordinarily brutal and degrading. It would thus not be surprising if many aspects of current 'industry standards' fall below 'what the general public would consider decent.' In any case, it is
clearly erroneous to assume that 'average' conditions will invariably pass constitutional
muster.").
115. See, e.g., Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 ("[T]he Constitution contemplates that in the end
[a court's] own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of a
given punishment."). But see Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275 (1984) ("Eighth Amendment judgments should neither be nor appear to be merely the subjective views [of judges]
• . . judgment[s] should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent.").

SENTENCED TO PRISON, SENTENCED TO

AIDS

In Rhodes v. Chapman,"'6 the Supreme Court considered "for
the first time the limitation that the eighth amendment

.

.

imposes

upon the conditions in which a state may confine those convicted of
crimes."" 7 In analyzing prisoners' claims that overcrowding in
prison violates the eighth amendment, the Court held that conditions
which "alone or in combination may deprive inmates of the minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities . . could be cruel and unusual
under the contemporary standard of decency ... ."I" Thus, while

stressing that prisons may be harsh without being unconstitutional, " 9 Rhodes also recognized that when the cumulative impact
of the conditions of confinement threatens the health of inmates or
creates a problem of recidivism, courts must conclude that the conditions of confinement violate the Constitution. For making such determinations, Rhodes reiterated the "standards of decency" test of
Trop v. Dulles.120
C.

The Eighth Amendment's Guarantee to Protection

1. General Right to Be Free From Physical Abuse.-Clearly,
the right to be protected from AIDS while incarcerated is inextrica-

bly bound to and vindicated in the right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment. In light of a statutorily imposed1 21 responsibility for prisoner protection, 2 ' courts have long recognized that in116. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
117. Id. at 344-45.
118. Id. at 347.
119. Id. ("But conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are not unconstitutional. To the extent that such conditions are restrictive and
even harsh, they are part of the reality that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society."); see also Martin v. White, 742 F.2d 469, 473-74 (8th Cir. 1984) ("Prisons need not
be country clubs, or even comfortable."); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, modified on other
grounds, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983) ("The totality of
conditions of confinement does not offend the Constitution unless prison conditions are cruel
and unusual, not merely harsh and restrictive.").
120. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 364 (Brennan, J., concurring); see supra note 112 and accompanying text.
121. 18 U.S.C. § 4042 (1968).
122. The section reads:
§ 4042. Duties of Bureau of Prisons
The Bureau of Prisons, under the direction of the Attorney General, shall
(1) have charge of the management and regulation of all Federal penal and
correctional institutions;
(2) provide suitable quarters and provide for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence of all persons charged with or convicted of offenses against the United
States;
(3) provide for the protection, instruction, and discipline of all persons
charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States;
(4) provide technical assistance to the state and local governments in the
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mates have an eighth amendment right, 123 and prison officials a corresponding duty,1"" to be protected from violence within the
correctional system. The rationale behind such a duty is logical; the

prisoners are not free to protect themselves.
reasonable

one. 12 6

25

The duty itself is a

To prove prison officials have breached their duty

to safeguard prisoner security, an inmate must show a pervasive risk
of harm to inmates from other prisoners 117 and that officials failed to
improvement of their correctional systems.
This section shall not apply to military or naval penal or correctional institutions or the persons confined therein.
18 U.S.C. § 4042 (1968).
For cases applying the statute, see Cowart v. United States, 617 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1980);
Jackson v. United States, 413 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (government was not liable
because of prisoner's own contributory negligence in inciting attack).
123. Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973) ("While occasional, isolated attacks by one prisoner on another may not constitute cruel and unusual punishment,
[a] prisoner has a right, secured by the eighth and fourteenth amendments, to be reasonably protected from constant threats of violence and sexual assault by his fellow inmates
....
"); see also Streeter v. Hopper, 618 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1980); Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d
304, 308 (8th Cir. 1971); Campbell v. Begeron, 486 F. Supp. 1246 (M.D. La. 1980); Doe v.
Lally, 457 F. Supp. 1339 (D.C. Md. 1979).
124. See Coffin v. Richard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944) ("Prisoners have a retained 'civil' right to personal security, and this right may impose a correlative duty upon
prison administrators to protect them from attacks by co-inmates.").
125. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 423 (1980) (Blackmun, J. dissenting)
(quoting Address by the Chief Justice, 25 Record of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New
York 114, 117 (Mar. 1970 Supp.)) ("It is society's responsibility to protect the life and health
of its prisoners. '[Wlhen a sheriff or a marshall [sic] takes a man from the courthouse in a
prison van and transports him to confinement for two or three or ten years, this is our act. We
have tolled the bell for him. And whether we like it or not, we have made him our collective
responsibility. We are free to do something about him; he is not.' "); Washington v. District of
Columbia, 802 F.2d 1478, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Thus the state is constitutionally obliged
to protect prisoners because it has forced them into a situation where they cannot help themselves."); Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507, 511 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[Wlhen the state takes someone into its care or cuts off sources of private aid, the state must afford replacement
protection.").
126. The duty is one of reasonable care. The Restatement of Torts states:
§ 320. Duty of Person Having Custody of Another to Control Conduct of
Third Persons
One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes custody of
another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal power of
self-protection or to subject him to association with persons likely to harm him,
is under a duty of exercising reasonable care so as to control the conduct of third
persons as to prevent them from intentionally harming the other or so conducting themselves as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to him, if the actor
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the
conduct of the third persons, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 (1965).
127. Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973). The court noted,
A pervasive risk of harm may not ordinarily be shown by pointing to a
single incident or isolated incidents, but it may be established by much less than
proof of a reign of violence and terror in the particular institution . . . . It is
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exercise reasonable care to alleviate the risk. 2 8 Traditionally, to sub-

stantiate claims of unreasonable care, prisoners have been required
to prove that prison officials have displayed "deliberate indifference"
to a known or predictable danger.129 Thus, although mere negligence
will not form the basis for an eighth amendment claim, 3 0 officials
who have known or should have known' 3 ' that an inmate would be
physically assaulted, 13 2 but have failed to take steps to protect that

inmate, have deprived him of his eighth amendment rights.' 33
2. Specific Applications of the Right to Be Protected: Homosexual Assault and Communicable Diseases.-In addition to a right
to be protected from physical abuse in general, courts have also recognized an eighth amendment right to be free from homosexual attack. 3 As with physical abuse in general, a prisoner's right to be
enough that violence or sexual assaults occur . . . with sufficient frequency that
the . . . prisoners . . . are put in reasonable fear for their safety and to reasonably apprise prison officials of the existence of the problem and the need for protective measures.
Id., see also Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 340 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Where assaults occur so
frequently as to be 'pervasive,' a substantial risk of violence is apparent."); Ramos v. Lamm,
639 F.2d 559, 572 (10th Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981) (citing Woodhous, 487
F.2d at 890) (A showing of pervasive risk "does not require that (an inmate] wait until he is
actually assaulted before obtaining relief."); Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158, 161 (4th Cir.
1980).
128. Woodhous, 487 F.2d at 890.
129. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Deliberate indifference may be evidenced by either actual intent or reckless disregard. Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193, 197 (7th
Cir. 1977). A defendant acts recklessly when he disregards a substantial risk of danger that
either is known to him or would be apparent to a reasonable person in his position. Benson,
761 F.2d at 339.
130. Estate of Davis v. Johnson, 745 F.2d 1066, 1070 (7th Cir. 1984); United States ex
rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 719-21 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146
(1974).
131. Annotators have focused on the knowledge requirement as a prerequisite for relief
especially for § 1983 liability. See Annotation, (Title), 41 A.L.R.3d 1030 § 5 (1972) and cases
cited therein.
132. A prisoner need not actually be assaulted to suffer eighth amendment deprivations.
Richardson v. Penfold, 650 F. Supp. 810, 814 (N.D. Ind. 1986) ("Although this guarantee
generally is implicated only when an inmate is assaulted, risks to an inmate's safety alone may
violate his rights when the threats are so constant that a virtual reign of terror exists."); see
also Murphey v. United States, 653 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d
1364 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The danger of assault may be proved by evidence of events at other
penal institutions in the area, as well as at the institution of which the prisoner is serving his
sentence.").
133. Such officials may also subject themselves to § 1983 liability. See, e.g., Walsh v.
Brewer, 733 F.2d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 1984); Stewart v. Love, 646 F.2d 43, 44 (6th Cir. 1982);
Branchcomb v. Brewmand, 683 F.2d 1297, 1298 (8th Cir. 1982); Wade v. Hayes, 663 F.2d
778, 781 (8th Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983); Little v. Walker,
552 F.2d 193, 197-98 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978).
134. See, e.g., Wojtczak v. Cuyler, 480 F. Supp. 1288, 1303 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (quoting
United States ex rel. Ricketts v. Lightcap, 567 F.2d 1226, 1235 (3d Cir. 1977) (concurring
opinion) ("[Tlhe right of a prisoner to be reasonably free from an atmosphere conducive of
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free from homosexual assault creates a corresponding duty in prison
officials to prevent sexually assaultive behavior between non-consenting inmates.18 5 In limited circumstances, courts have even recognized that the failure of officials to discharge this duty may serve as
a defense of necessity for an escape attempt.1 3 Further, in an area

most analogous to a right to be protected from AIDS, the judiciary
has also extended the eighth amendment right to be free from general physical abuse to exposure to communicable diseases.18 7 In or-

der to make such an extension, the courts have concluded that such
exposure, like that to homosexual assault and general violence, offends our "standards of decency" by "involving unnecessary and
wanton affliction of pain" that is "totally without penological
justification."13 8
3.

Application to AIDS: A Recognition and a Remedy.-The

judiciary's recognition of prisoners' general right to be free from
physical abuse, and specific applications of that right as guaranteed
by the eighth amendment, has direct implication for a possible right
to be protected from AIDS, a deadly disease that threatens to subject prisoners to another type of physical abuse. In light of the public

clamor over AIDS in the general population, it seems axiomatic that
a prisoner's being subjected to a possible sentence of AIDS offends
our "standard of decency." Because of the excruciating pain and suf-

fering that accompanies the onset and duration of the disease, conditions of confinement that impose AIDS upon prisoners certainly involve "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" that is "totally
sexual assault is a constitutional right; it falls within the eighth amendment right against cruel
and unusual punishment.").
135. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980); Jones v. Diamond, 636
F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1981); Holt v. Sanver, 442 F.2d 304, 308 (8th Cir. 1971); Richardson v.
Penfold, 650 F. Supp. 810 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
136. See, e.g., People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974).
The court noted that
the persons in charge of our prisons and jails are obliged to take reasonable
precautions in order to provide a place of confinement where a prisoner is safe
from gang rapes and beatings by fellow inmates, safe from guard ignorance of
pleas for help and safe from intentional placement into situations where an assault of one type of [sic] another is likely to result. If our prison system fails to
live up to its responsibilities in this regard we should not, indirectly, countenance
such a failure by precluding the presentation of a defense based on those facts.
Id.
137. See Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 109 (2d Cir. 1981); Smith v. Sullivan, 553
F.2d 373, 380 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Jones, 636 F.2d at 1374. "The constant and habitual
exposure of convicted prisoners to persons who are contagiously ill is also reprobated as cruel
and unusual punishment." The remedy for such exposure has been to enjoin officials to enforce
proper classification and segregation of contagiously ill prisoners within the prison. Id.
138. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
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without penological justification." Thus, just as prisoners have a
right to be free from communicable disease, homosexual assault, and
general violent abuse, so too do they have a right to be protected
from AIDS. This right imposes upon officials a duty to protect pris-

oners, which, if not voluntarily respected, must be judicially enforced. 89 This duty can be met by a carefully designed program consisting of segregation, testing, and training.
a. Segregation.-Segregationof AIDS-carriers from the general population would be an effective method of protecting AIDSfree inmates from exposure to the virus. Despite its effectiveness in
reducing transmission, however, many correctional facilities do not
segregate all inmates who have the potential to infect others.14 0 Even
after a limited testing program of federal inmates has revealed a
higher than predicted seropositive rate, 41 federal correctional officials only plan to institute a program of limited segregation for those
seropositive inmates who have a history of sexual aggressiveness or
promiscuity. 4 2 Most prisons routinely segregate only those inmates
with full-blown AIDS 4" since such segregation facilitates treatment
44
and preserves prison discipline.
Suits by prisoners seeking to be protected from AIDS have frequently asked for segregation of all seropositive inmates.'4 Inrefus139. A failure to uphold that right may, as in denials of other civil rights, subject officials to judicial intervention and administration as well as civil liability. See Judd v. Packard,
No. S. 87-1514, slip op. at (D.C. Md. Sept. 24, 1987) ("In fact, it may well be that
prison officials might face a § 1983 suit for failing to isolate a known AIDS patient or carrier,
if the carrier infects another inmate who could show that such failure to isolate constituted
grossly negligent or reckless conduct on the part of such officials.").
140. UPDATE, supra note 5, at 10. As of October 1986, only 27% of city and county jail
systems responding to a Justice Department survey were segregating all seropositive inmates.
Id.
141. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
142. Yost, U.S. to Segregate Some AIDS Inmates, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 24,
1987, at 10-A, col. 1.
143. See New York Inmates Will Get Condoms as They Leave Jail, N.Y. Times, Apr.
14, 1987, at B-6, col. 1. But see Va. Inmate Says Positive AIDS Test Put Him in Hole, The
Washington Post, Aug. 18, 1987, at B-7, col. 2 (reporting that one prisoner worked in the
prison bakery until the day he died from AIDS).
144. AIDS victims suffer a great risk of assault in the general population, and thus
segregation, in addition to protecting other inmates from infection, protects the sufferers themselves. See N.Y. Inmates Will Get Condoms as They Leave Jail, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1987,
at B-6, col. I ("If the inmates hear someone has the virus, they're ready to do him in."); AIDS
in Prison: Hard Questions for the Justice System, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1987, at B-I, col. 2
(quoting a prisoner with AIDS on the prospect of being housed in the general population: "I'd
never stand a chance out there. The other prisoners would try to get rid of me. I'd be killed for
certain.").
145. See Muhammad v. Warden, C.A. No. 87-5282 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1987); Smith-bey
v. Captain of the Guard, No. 86-3274, slip op. (D.C. Kan. Dec. II, 1986); Foy v. Owens, No.
85-6909, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 1986).
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ing to intervene and enforce such a remedy, the courts have stressed
that segregation is not necessary, because AIDS cannot be transmitted in prison.'" Such reasoning is contradicted not only by facts and
statistics from studies of correctional institutions 147 but also by decisions of other courts upholding administratively imposed segregation
of AIDS inmates. 148 These cases recognize that a prison official's decision to segregate seropositive inmates is proper, because such segregation furthers legitimate correctional objectives - the prevention
of the spread of disease and the protection of the seropositive inmate
from others. 1 49 These courts further recognize that the power of officials to segregate is not violative of the rights of those being segregated. 150 Prisoners have no right to be housed in the general population,' 5' and officials who use segregation to protect inmates from
each other act within the confines of the Constitution. 52 The judiciary has indeed recognized that, in some circumstances, a failure to
segregate may alone constitute cruel and unusual punishment.5 3
In light of the right and need to segregate, it is somewhat surprising that many prisons do not have a policy of segregation for
146. See Muhammad, slip op. at _
; Smith-bey, slip op. at _
; Foy, slip op. at
_.
Such hesitancy to intervene may also be grounded in the deference standard; see supra
notes 68-100 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 37-63 and accompanying text.
148. See Judd v. Packard, No. S. 87-1514, slip op. (D.C. Md. Sept. 24, 1987); Powell v.
Department of Corrections, No. 85-C-820-C, No. 85-C-816-B, slip op. (N.D. Okla. Feb. 20,
1986); Cordero v. Coughlin, No. 84 Civ. 782, slip op. at (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1984)
("[P]laintiffs' situations are indeed grim. They suffer from an incurable, fatal disease, both the
genesis and transmission of which is poorly understood. They are therefore greatly feared by
fellow inmates and, apparently, ostracized . . . . [D]efendants are doing their best [by segregating] to cope with an extraordinarily difficult problem involving issues of correctional management, security, and health care provision."); La Rocca v. Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d 697, 467
N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1983) ("Segregation was a reasonable means of controlling forcible
transmission of AIDS.").
149. Powell, slip op. at -.
150. Denial of other rights within medically imposed segregation, however, may implicate constitutional violations. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
151. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1982) ("[Tlhe transfer of an inmate to less
amenable and more restrictive quarters for non-punitive reasons is well within the terms of
confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence.").
152. Courts have traditionally given great weight to prison administrators' determinations regarding isolation and segregation of exposed and infected inmates. Turner v. Safley,
U.S. -,
107 S. Ct. 2254, 2259-62 (1987); see also Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318
(4th Cir. 1975) (a medical judgment in a prison setting that requires medical isolation for
diagnostic and treatment purposes should be respected).
153. Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1375 (5th Cir. 1981) (to protect prisoners from
violence and contagious diseases, prisons must employ systems of proper classification and segregation); Judd v. Packard, No. S. 87-1514, slip op. (D.C. Md. Sept. 24, 1987) (recognizing
the possibility that a failure to isolate a known AIDS carrier may constitute cruel and unusual
punishment); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 597 F. Supp. 1388 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (a failure to properly separate younger prisoners from hardened prisoners may constitute cruel and unusual
punishment).
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AIDS carriers. There are, however, obvious, yet constitutionally infirm policy reasons for a policy of nonsegregation. First, large-scale
segregation, as may be necessary if the incidence rate of AIDS in
prison continues to rise, is a costly measure that disrupts and confuses prison routine. Absent segregation, AIDS-carriers can be serviced in mass as part of the general population. Segregation, in contrast, requires separate if not individualized quarters and services,
which impose a need for different facilities and larger correctional
staffs for which the nation's prisons are not currently equipped or
budgeted.154 Such economic rationale does not, however, abrogate
the constitutional duty of prison officials to protect inmates from
AIDS. The judiciary has recognized that while monetary considerations are a very real problem within the correctional system, they are
not a defense to a failure to provide minimum constitutional
1 55
standards.
Some state correctional systems have also expressed concern
that they should not deviate from the policies considered appropriate
for the society at large."" Thus, because citizens in free society who
are AIDS-carriers or sufferers are not permitted to be segregated,
prison officials claim prisons should likewise not segregate these individuals. Such reasoning is fallacious because it ignores the constraints and conditions imposed upon the incarcerated. While within
an express exercise of its police powers government may have a very
limited right to restrain the liberty of its free citizens, it has broad
power and responsibility to restrain those incarcerated because prisoners retain "only a narrow range of protected liberty interests. 1 57
Further, unlike members of society at large, prisoners may not always choose whether or not to engage in activities in which they may
contract AIDS. 58 Therefore, because the incarcerated are in a world
entirely foreign to that of general society, the policies which may be
permissible, even mandatory, in the correctional system may not be
154. See UPDATE, supra note 5, at 10. The Department of Justice has concluded that
the trend away from segregation in many of the nation's prisons is due in part to a concern
that their segregation capacity will soon be insufficient to accommodate increasing numbers of
AIDS patients. Id.
155. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968).
156. See UPDATE, supra note 5, at II. Michigan, for example, has decided to base housing decisions on individual security classifications, rather than on AIDS-related categories. Its
policy is that "HIV-infected prisoners who do not require inpatient care will be eligible for
general population housing at any institution which can meet their health care and security
needs." Id. (citing PROTOCOL FOR THE PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT OF HIV INFECTION IN
THE MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 9-11 (Oct. 1986)).
157. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1982).
158. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
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the same as those most beneficial or proper for general society.
Prison officials have expressed one concern regarding segregation that has merit - segregation may deprive those segregated of
both constitutional rights and other correctional privileges which, although they do not rise to a constitutional level,159 do nevertheless
contribute to the rehabilitative process. 6 The number of suits filed
by AIDS-infected prisoners lends credence to such a concern. These
suits allege deprivation of a wide range of rights and privileges, including access to educational and recreation facilities, 16 equal protection,"' conjugal visits,16* and first amendment rights of association and group worship.'" Although prisons may prevail in these
suits by providing limited alternatives for guaranteed constitutional
rights, 6" without taking any steps to provide privileges not required
to be afforded, such conditions sow a fertile ground for disruptive
inmate discipline problems and a parched one for rehabilitative
progress.

Thus, while prison officials may have the power and the duty to
segregate AIDS carriers, problematic fiscal and rehabilitation issues

encourage them not to do so. Admittedly, a cursory plan for segregation may indeed not pose the optimum solution to the AIDS-inprison problem. A carefully tailored plan, however, that accommodates limited financial and administrative resources as well as the
interests of those segregated does. Fortunately, such a solution is
possible.

Separate AIDS wings or, as the AIDS rate spirals, separate
prisons 66 for carriers and sufferers provide a solution in an efficient
159. The Supreme Court has held that correctional facilities have no constitutional duty
to provide prisoners in segregation with pleasant conditions. Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. 1312,
1315-16 (1980) ("I know of nothing in the eighth amendment that requires that [inmates] be
housed in a manner most pleasing to them or considered even by the most knowledgeable penal
authorities to be likely to avoid psychological confrontations, psychological depression, and the
like."). Rather, the degree of eighth amendment scrutiny afforded to an inmate is limited to
ensuring that he receives "adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety." Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 1978).
160. See UPDATE supra note 5, at 10.
161. Powell v. Department of Corrections, No. 85-C-820-C, No. 85-C-816-B slip op.
(N.D. Okla. Feb. 20, 1986).
162. Id. Cordero v. Coughlin, No. 84 Civ. 728, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1984).
163. Doe v. Coughlin, 132 Misc. 2d 709, 505 N.Y.S.2d 534 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
164. See, e.g., Powell, slip op. at _
; Cordero, slip op. at _
; But cf.Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977) ("First amendment rights are
limited by the fact of confinement, and the needs of the penal institution.").
165. For example, prisons may make chaplains available for individual worship. See
Powell, slip op. at _.
166. The Reagan Administration has considered the idea of separate prisons but to date
has not acted on the possibility because of possible staffing problems and difficulties in grouping different security classifications together with only AIDS common to all. U.S. Says No to
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and a humane way. Prisons that currently segregate by what can
amount to almost solitary confinement do so for two reasons: to
guard against the involuntary transmission of the disease to non-carriers and to protect carriers from almost certain attack. 167 Segregation of AIDS-carriers in separate prisons or separate wings addresses
and alleviates both of these concerns. The prisoners housed in such
institutions need not fear involuntary contraction of the virus; they
already have it. For this reason, within their wing or prison, they
need not fear attack or ostracization by their fellow inmates; rather,
everyone would be comrades of sorts, and compassion and understanding would replace animosity and alienation. With both of these
concerns addressed, officials could administrate the wing or prison as
the general population of any prison' 6 8 at the same administrative
cost. The AIDS-carriers, too, would benefit from such a proposal.
While insulated from the threat of assault that stems naturally from
fear of their disease, they could participate in recreational and rehabilitative programs as members of the "general population" of such
wings or institutions.
b. Testing.-For a segregation policy to be truly effective,
prisoners carrying the virus or suffering from AIDS itself must be
identified through mass HTLV-III antibody screening. Although
such testing implicates an encroachment upon the right to privacy,
such an infringement in the correctional setting is reasonable and
therefore constitutional. 6'9 Courts have even suggested that prison
officials not only have a right to perform such testing but also a duty.
The Fifth Circuit has held that a failure to adequately screen newly
arrived inmates for communicable diseases violates the eighth
amendment, even in the absence of any evidence that the disease has
70
actually spread through an institution.'
Despite the fact that correctional officials have the power to test
prisoners for the HTLV-III antibody, most correctional systems do
Condoms,
167.
op. (N.D.
168.

The Philadelphia Inquirer, June 29, 1987, at 3-A, Col. 2.
See, e.g., Powell v. Department of Corrections, No. 85-C-820-C, 85-C-816-B, slip
Okla. Feb. 20, 1986).
As in existing correctional institutions, security classifications will still serve to sep-

arate some prisoners from others.
169. As long as the goal is legitimate and the means are reasonably related to achieving
the goal, courts will uphold such infringements. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). The
Supreme Court has upheld even greater infringements upon personal privacy rights in the
correctional setting. See id. (upholding body cavity searches).
170. See Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 109 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 380 (5th Cir. 1977).
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Cost is the primary reason for this pol-

icy.1 An initial ELISA test for antibodies to the HTLV-III virus
costs approximately $5.00 per test when conducted in an in-house
laboratory.17a Because of the test's propensity for error, positive results are usually corroborated with a second ELISA test and the

more accurate Western Blot test, which is substantially more costly
with an average price of $125.17' Additional cost is also incurred by
repeated interval follow-up testing for evidence of symptoms of the
disease itself.'7 5 Finally, many systems have balked at mass screening because of the long-range and potentially gargantuan costs of
such testing - the costs of implementing programs for the discovered seropositive individuals. 70
Despite established precedent to the contrary, officials have also

expressed concern over testing's infringement of privacy rights. Because the Center for Disease Control has recommended that there be
no routine screening of the population at large, correctional systems
have adopted the approach that mass screening is no more produc-

tive, desirable, or permissible in correctional settings than in society
at large.

77

Some states have gone as far as passing laws that pro-

hibit HTLV-III antibody testing of members of the general population without the informed consent of the subject.' 78 Especially controversial in the issue of inmate privacy is the problem of disclosure
of the test results. The dilemma posed sets an inmate's right to privacy , 7 9 against the State's need to protect public health.'

Fortu-

171. See UPDATE, supra note 5, at 8. There is no mass screening in the four jurisdictions
New York State, New York City, New Jersey, and Florida - that now collectively account
for 70% of all inmate AIDS cases. Those who do screen have low incidence rates of AIDS or
screen in restricted applications so that few seropositives will be identified and few correctional
problems will result. Id. at II. Even a recent federal testing program of federal inmates, originally planned to encompass all inmates, was quickly reduced to those entering and leaving the
correctional system and those within the system who requested testing. Prisoner Tests Show
No AIDS Epidemic Yet, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1987, at I, col. 4.
172. Such concern fails to take into consideration the potential cost of AIDS transmission behind bars and increased numbers of infected inmates. See infra notes 197-201 and
accompanying text.
173. ISSUES AND OPTIONS, supra note 20, at 36.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See id. "If you did screen, there would be irresistible pressure to segregate them, or
do something with them. Logistically and fiscally, it would be a real problem." Slow Rise
Found in Prison AIDS Cases, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1986, at A-18, col. I. Further, identifying
individuals without segregating them could leave officials open to liability suits. ISSUES AND
OPTIONS, supra note 20, at 35.
177. UPDATE, supra note 5, at II.
178. Id. Both California and Wisconsin have passed such laws.
179. "Somebody may show positive, and never have anything, never transmit anything.
Yet they're put at risk if the results are known to anyone; pretty soon, all the prisoners in a
cellblock know." N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1986, at A-18, col. I (quoting Alvin J. Bronstein,
-
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nately, there are some emerging answers to the problem. Both federal and state laws in many states bar prison officials from disclosing

the medical condition of an inmate, 181 and most systems have enacted some policy to protect inmate confidentiality while encourag-

1 82
ing the inmate to contact family members who could be at risk.
The judiciary has been reluctant to become involved in the
AIDS testing dilemma. When inmates have requested court-ordered
screening, courts have deferred to administrative decisions not to
screen and thereby denied injunctive relief. 83 Even in an exigent cir-

cumstance when one inmate suspected of having AIDS assaulted a

guard, a state court refused to require the antibody test on the
grounds that such testing is discriminatory and violates the inmate's
civil rights. 8 4 In contrast, when policies of screening are in place in
a prison and are challenged by inmates, courts have been quick to
uphold such screening policies. 8 5 They reason that the identification
of potential AIDS carriers, as part of a program of AIDS prevention, has a legitimate purpose, especially in the prison setting.' 8 6

It is the reasoning of these latter courts that should define an
effective correctional policy towards AIDS-prevention in our nation's
Director of the National Prison Project of the ACLU); see also ISSUES AND OPTIONS, supra
note 20, at 56 ("Those infected suffer ostracism, threats, and possible violent intimidation
while in prison, and discrimination in employment, housing, and insurance when out.").
180. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1987, at B-I, 33 col. 2 (quoting George Torodasch, President of the New York State Parole Officers Ass'n: "Of course, many of the parolees are going
to have sex, and no parole officer is going to be able to stop them . . . . I had one guy assigned
to me who simply didn't care. The guy was given about a year to live, and he was in total
despair. He told me he was going to have sex with as many prostitutes as he could get his
hands on, just to get even. What do I do, since he isn't violating his parole? He can kill
someone, and we can't do a thing about it.").
181. N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1987, at B-I, col. 1.
182. Id. Two-thirds of all state and federal systems have either general or specific confidentiality policies covering AIDS-related medical information. ISSUES AND OPTIONS, supra
note 20, at 55. New Mexico, for example, has developed a comprehensive policy that provides
for "strict scrutiny of all HTLV-I1 antibody test results, restrictions on the use of the term
'AIDS' on medical charts in the absence of a firm diagnosis, and disciplinary measures for
persons divulging confidential information on patients with HTLV-I1 infections." UPDATE,
supra note 5, at 13.
183. See Jarrett v. Faulkner, 662 F. Supp. 928 (S.D. Ind. 1987); Smith-bey v. Captain
of the Guard, No. 86-3274 slip op. (D.C. Kan. Dec. II, 1986); La Rocca v. Dalsheim, 120
Misc. 2d 697, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
184. NAT'L L.J., Sept. 28, 1987, at 6, col. 3. The Massachusetts trial judge found that a
prisoner cannot be forced to take an AIDS test merely because a prison guard fears that he
has the disease. The controversy developed after an incarcerated male prostitute scratched the
guard and spat on him during a fight. The guard claims that, since the incident, he suffers
emotional trauma worrying about contracting the disease and has been thwarted from maintaining conjugal relations with his wife.
185. See Judd v. Packard, No. S 87-1514, slip op. (D.C. Md. Sept. 24, 1987) (utilizing
a rational basis standard of review).
186. Id.
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prisons. If courts can require correctional facilities to screen for less
serious communicable diseases such as gonorrhea,881 they can also
require such facilities to screen for AIDS. When officials and legislators have rejected their constitutional responsibility to protect inmates by instituting such a policy on their own, courts must discharge their own constitutional responsibility to protect threatened
rights."18
c. Additional Measures.-Additional measures have been suggested and implemented to supplement a program of mass screening
and structured segregation of AIDS carriers. The education of inmates has proven to be a relatively inexpensive and well-received
method of preventing the transmission of AIDS behind bars. In addition to reducing unproductive fear about AIDS and its transmission, the training of inmates may have special value in reducing the
voluntary though unwitting means by which AIDS is transmitted namely consensual homosexuality and intravenous drug abuse. The
majority of correctional facilities have indeed recognized the importance of such training; ninety-four percent of state and federal jails
provide live training, audio-visual programs, or written materials to
their inmates while seventy-seven percent of city and county facilities do so. 189 Even inmates themselves have become involved with the
training process. A group of New York State inmates recently organized and produced an audiovisual program entitled AIDS - A
Bad Way to Die, which features interviews with AIDS patients in
the prison system.190 Education, however, can only supplement, not
replace, a policy of segregation and testing. It will do little, if anything, to halt involuntary transmission through homosexual assault
and may only reduce, not eradicate, the voluntary actions of needle
sharing and homosexual sodomy.1
Some corrections officials have suggested even more radical
means of preventing transmission, particularly the issuance of condoms to inmates. Since the Surgeon General released a report suggesting that the use of condoms may prevent transmission,"" many
187. Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 380 (5th Cir. 1977).
188. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
189. UPDATE, supra note 5, at 6. City and county rates are lower partly because of the
high rate of turnover in these jails. Id.
190. Id.
191. Despite the threat of AIDS, many prisoners knowingly engage in high-risk activities. See, e.g., Officials Face Difficult Choices; AIDS Victims in Prison: Death Row in a Hospital, L.A. Times, July 19, 1987, at 1, col. I (reporting that many inmates continue to have

sex with persons with confirmed cases of AIDS).
192.

N.Y. Times, June 30, 1987, at A-18, col. 3.
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prison officials have considered the possibility. Currently, all Vermont state prisoners and a select group of New York City prisoners
may receive condoms upon request. 9 ' Yet, the Reagan administration has ruled out such a possibility in federal prisons. 194 Inmate reaction to condom issuance policies has varied. Most prisoners are
skeptical of their effectiveness; 195 others have suggested the issuance
of clean needles as well. 96
IV.

Beyond the Constitution

Whatever place condoms or clean needles may have in an
AIDS-prevention program, the constitutional requirement for such a
program in general is unequivocal. Society's interest in such a program, however, extends beyond the Constitution and its requirements to self-interest and self-preservation. Simply put, a sound policy for AIDS-prevention behind bars makes sense, fiscally and
sociologically, for society at large.
Medical bills for inmates suffering from AIDS are astronomical. Prisons spend from $40,000 to $600,000 each year on hospital
and medical costs for each inmate with AIDS. 97 While advanced
technology may reduce the cost per patient, this nation can expect

that its total medical care costs for AIDS inmates will increase and
consume an increasingly large proportion of prison budgets and public tax dollars as the incidence rate of AIDS in our prisons continues
to rise. Because prisons have an affirmative duty to provide adequate

medical care to those incarcerated within their walls,' 98 prevention of
an increase in total victims with the resultant prevention of transmis193. See Free Condoms for Convicts, TIME, Apr. 27, 1987, at 60; New York City Inmates Will Get Condoms As They Leave Jail, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1987, at B-6, col. 1. In
addition, all prisoners released from New York City jails will receive a special AIDS prevention kit containing both condoms and educational materials. N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1987, at B6, col. I.
194. U.S. Says No to Condoms in Federal Jails, The Philadelphia Inquirer, June 29,
1987, at 3-A, col. 2. Justice Department officials have reasoned that because homosexual sex is
against prison regulations, officials cannot assume "a two-faced position" by passing out condoms. Id.
195. AIDS in Prison: Hard Questions for the Justice System, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5,
1987, at I, col. 2 ("That's totally crazy. Do you think someone who is about to rape you is
going to stop and think about a condom? No way.").
196. Id. ("[T]hey'd better give out needles first, because drugs are far more prevalent
here than sex.").
197. ISSUES AND OPTIONS, supra note 20, at 59.
198. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) ("Deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.").
Numerous suits have been filed by inmates suffering from AIDS, who allege that they are not
being provided with adequate medical care. See, e.g., McDuffie v. Rikers Island Medical
Dept., No. 86 Civ. 5191, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1987).
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sion, is the only way to substantially lower this cost burden.

In an attempt to shift costs for expensive treatment, some prison
systems have decided to release inmates suffering from AIDS prior
to the expiration of their sentence.' 99 Such releases, however, potentially impose even greater costs upon society as some of the early
released prisoners have committed crimes within hours of their release.2"' Especially problematic would be those sufferers who hold
grudges for their own illnesses and would seek to intentionally transmit it upon their release."0 ' In such circumstances, the effect to public health could be catastrophic. Therefore, society at large, as well
as prisoners, would benefit from a comprehensive prevention program against AIDS transmission within the corrections system.
V. Conclusion
It is clear that AIDS prevention programs do have a constitutionally-mandated place within our prison system, born out of a prisoner's eighth amendment right to personal security. In the prison
environment, where drug abuse and homosexual rape create a fertile
ground for transmission of a virus that travels most efficiently
through blood and semen, prisoners are confronted daily with a prevalent risk of contracting an incurable, fatal disease. Prison officials
who ignore this risk and fail to respond to it with appropriate protective policies violate the eighth amendment's proscription against
cruel and unusual punishment. Courts who hear claims of such failure and yet refuse to intervene violate their own constitutional duty
to protect such rights.
The failure of corrections officials and the subsequent refusal of
the courts to protect inmates from AIDS results in two victims: society, who must bear not only the mounting costs of medical treatment
for increasing numbers of infected inmates, but also the potentially
catastrophic costs and loss of widespread transmission when large
numbers of AIDS carriers are released or paroled, and, of course,
the infected inmate himself. He may have been sentenced to the ordinary and proper six months, one year, or ten years, but his actual
199. N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1987, at I, col. 2. In the past two years, approximately fifty
New York State inmates suffering from AIDS have been parolled early.
200. Id. One inflicted defendant, who, after holding up a supermarket, was permitted to
plead to a lesser charge to obtain parole, held up the same supermarket hours after his release.
id.
201. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. Indeed, some systems concerned with
the problem have considered late release for those who make threats to spread their disease
throughout society. See Bennett Would Detain Some Carriers of AIDS, N.Y. Times, June 15,
1987, at A-13, col. 1.

SENTENCED TO PRISON, SENTENCED TO

AIDS

sentence - a sentence to AIDS - is far beyond what any court
would consider ordinary and proper. It is beyond what any society
concerned with rehabilitation as well as retribution should consider
decent and permissible. A sentence of imprisonment should not carry
with it a sentence of AIDS. To insure that it does not, prison officials
need to take affirmative action consisting of mass screening, privilege-conscious segregation, and informative training. When such
measures are not taken, the judiciary needs to put aside a too-easily
invoked deference standard and protect not only the threatened constitutional rights of those incarcerated but also the public health and
safety of society at large.
And now was acknowledged the presence of the Red Death. He
had come like a thief in the night. And one by one dropped the
revellers in the blood-bedewed halls of their revel, and died
each in the despairing posture of his fall. And the life of the
ebony clock went out with that of the last gay. And the flames
of the tripods expired. And Darkness and Decay and the Red
20 2
Death held illimitable dominion over all.
Kathy J. Gardner

202.

PoE, supra note I, at 258.

